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Kulture Vulture!'s avatar

Thanks for writing this. I live in a city where people are trotting out the Austin model to justify cutting rental and tenant protections. It is wild how warmed over these arguments are.

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clay shentrup's avatar

the article relies on several economic fallacies, temporal mismatches (using 30-year data to refute 3-year policy changes), and a misunderstanding of how market cycles function.

here is a fact check and analytical breakdown of the key claims.

1. real vs. nominal rents

claim: the "rent collapse" is a misleading snapshot; rents are still massively up over 5 years. analysis: false/misleading due to inflation ignorance. the author looks at nominal rent prices. the comment by "reed schwartz" at the bottom of the post actually identifies the flaw: cumulative inflation since 2016 is roughly 30%.

if rents are flat or slightly up in nominal terms over 5 years, they have likely fallen in real terms (purchasing power).

austin is one of the only major cities where rent growth is currently trailing inflation significantly. ignoring the macro inflationary environment of 2021-2023 distorts the data to make the housing market look more expensive than it is relative to wages and other goods.

2. the "market failure" of the construction pullback

claim: developers stopping construction because rents dropped is a failure of the market model. analysis: this is a fundamental misunderstanding of feedback loops.

the author treats the business cycle as a "failure." when supply exceeds demand, prices drop (good for renters). this price signal tells capital to stop building (allocative efficiency).

if developers continued building despite falling rents, it would represent a waste of resources (capital destruction).

critically, the stock of housing remains. the buildings built during the boom do not disappear when the developers stop building. that permanent increase in supply is what lowers long-term price equilibrium.

3. sprawl vs. infill data mismatch

claim: austin is just sprawling; "half of recent new construction... is single family homes." analysis: misleading/outdated data context.

the author cites a william & mary study covering 1990 to 2020. this is irrelevant to evaluating the "yimby" reforms and supply boom that occurred roughly 2021–2024.

during the actual "austin miracle" period (2022-2024), multifamily permits skyrocketed. in 2023, the austin metro permitted more units per capita than almost anywhere in the us, and the majority of that pipeline was multifamily apartments, not sfh sprawl.

the author is using a 30-year trend of sprawl (which yimbys also oppose) to attack a recent 3-year trend of densification.

4. the geography/land price fallacy

claim: austin is cheap because it has land (sprawl), whereas san francisco is expensive because of geography/maturity. cites land cost of $5.8m/acre (austin) vs $22m/acre (sf). analysis: circular reasoning.

land values are residual. sf land is expensive because you are legally restricted from building enough floor space to satisfy demand. the scarcity is regulatory, not just geographic.

if sf upzoned the "sleepy sunset neighborhood" to allow 50-story towers, the per-unit land cost would drop drastically, even if the per-acre land value spiked.

comparing rural kansas to austin is a straw man; austin is a high-demand tech hub. the fact that it remained cheaper than sf despite similar demand shocks implies that supply elasticity (policy) mattered, not just "available dirt."

5. displacement and "natural" affordability

claim: new development destroys "naturally occurring affordable housing" (noah). analysis: ignores the counterfactual (filtering).

if you don't build new "luxury" units, high-income earners don't leave the city; they buy the older "naturally affordable" buildings and renovate them.

blocking the redevelopment of the northwest austin complex mentioned doesn't guarantee those tenants stay forever; it usually guarantees the building gets bought by a private equity firm, cosmetically renovated, and rented for higher rates anyway—but without adding net new supply to absorb the demand.

6. the social housing alternative & in-kind inefficiency

claim: the only real solution is public ownership (vienna/singapore model) rather than market mechanisms. analysis: this advocates for inefficient in-kind benefits and ignores the root cause of the shortage.

in-kind vs. cash: social housing is an in-kind benefit—a restricted subsidy tied to a specific physical unit rather than the person. welfare economics shows this creates deadweight loss compared to cash. a recipient often derives less utility from a lottery-assigned apartment than they would from the equivalent cash value, which they could allocate to housing or other needs that maximize their own welfare.

paternalism: insisting on building government-owned units rather than redistributing wealth (via ubi or vouchers) is paternalistic. it implies low-income people cannot be trusted to manage their own resources and must have their consumption curated by the state ("treating the poor like children").

removing deadweight loss: the goal is not to "increase supply" as an active state project, but to remove the regulatory deadweight loss (zoning restrictions) that artificially limits the market. once these artificial costs are removed, the market will naturally reach an efficient equilibrium where quantity meets demand. coupling this deregulation with cash transfers (to handle redistribution) solves the problem without the inefficiency of state-planned construction.

summary

the article is a standard left-nimby critique that frames the recent price correction (a success of supply-side economics) as a failure because it isn't a permanent, infinite crash. it relies on data from the sprawl era (pre-2020) to critique the density era (post-2020) and fails to adjust for the massive inflationary wave that makes austin's rent stabilization historically significant.

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